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Gusea: Damages - Failure to Award General Damages in a Personal Injury A
DAMAGES-Failure to Award General Damages in a Personal Injury Action
When There is a Verdict for Substantial Hospital or Medical Expenses.
Smith v. Blair, 521 P.2d 581 (Wyo. 1974).

Joan Knight Smith sued Clarence Blair for injuries suffered when the vehicle in which she was a passenger was
struck from behind by a truck driven by Blair. The plaintiff
alleged the accident was a result of the defendant's negligence in driving without due caution or circumspection.
In a jury trial, a verdict was awarded to the plaintiff in
the amount of $2,015.15. The plaintiff appealed, claiming
that this verdict was improper and irregular in that it
awarded substantial hospital and medical expenses without
awarding any general damages for pain and suffering and
permanent disability.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, speaking through Justice

McIntyre, felt it "clear ... that the claims for hospital and
X-ray bills (in the amount of $1,410.15) were added to the
$605.00 for medical bills, making the total exactly $2,015.15. "1
The court thus held that the verdict, which awarded substantial medical and hospital expenses but nothing for general
damages, was improper and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial on the issue of the amount of damages.
IXTRODUCTION
Referring to an earlier Wyoming case2 involving substantially the same question as presented in Smith, the court
said that "as a general rule, the failure of a jury to award
general damages, in the face of an award for substantial medical and hospital expenses, results at least in an improper or
irregular verdict.'
Indeed, there exists substantial precedent in a variety
of jurisdictions in support of just such a general rule.' Nevertheless, not all verdicts awarding special but not general
CopyrightO 1975 by the University of Wyoming

1. Smith v. Blair, t21 P.2d 581, 582 (Wyo. 1974).
2. DeWitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734 .(Wyo. 1963).
3.

Smith v. Blair, supra note 1, at 581.

4. Wall v. Van Meter, 311 Ky. 198, 223 S.W.2d 734 (1949). See Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 276 (1951).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1975

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 10 [1975], Iss. 1, Art. 10

274

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. X

damagcs are overturned. Moreover, in those cases in which
such verdicts were overturned, analysis shows that the courts
did not do so simply as a matter of course by blindly applying
the general rule. It will be shown through an examination of
such cases in jurisdictions other than Wyoming that the evidence presented as to the injury suffered by the plaintiff is
the determining factor used by the courts in deciding whether
a verdict of this nature will be sustained or overturned.
It is submitted that the application of the above general
rule in Smith by the Wyoming Supreme Court is very strict,
a feature not found in other jurisdictions. It will be shown
that the obvious import of the decision in Smith is that, as
viewed by the Wyoming Supreme Court, an award for substantial medical and hospital expenses without an award for
general damages is improper or irregular per se.
A

QuEsTION oF EvIDENcE

As indicated previously, verdicts awarding special but
not general damages are not uniformly held to be invalid.
One would be in error, however, to infer that the rationale
used by courts in finding verdicts of such a nature invalid
differs from and conflicts with the rationale upon which
courts have sustained such verdicts. An analysis of the cases
involved shows that, although opposite results are reached,
a similar line of reasoning is pursued and the same general
rule is adhered to by the courts. Whether such a verdict is
overturned or affirmed invariably turns upon the question of
the evidence presented at trial.
While applying the basic general rule, the bases upon
which courts have held a verdict for special but not general
damages to be inadequate and invalid differ. In many cases

it was obvious that the decision was based upon the evidence
presented, the courts holding that the verdict was against the
great weight of evidence,5 or that the evidence was insufficient to justify the verdict.! Another ground used in support
5. Fordon v. Bender, 363 Mich. 124, 108 N.W.2d 896 (1961); Austria v. Donovan, 169 So. 2d 377 (Fla. App. 1964).
6. Gould v. Mans, 82 S.D. 574, 152 N.W.2d 92 (1967).
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of this position was that the jury failed to follow instructions'
or that the verdict was contrary to the instructions given
the jury."
While the above are the major grounds for holding a
verdict for special but not general damages improper, courts
have also held the result to be inadequate,9 inconsistent,'0 a
compromise," or a result of mistake, passion, prejudice or
partiality. 12 Although these grounds appear to differ, a common factor is seen to run through such cases.
The cases in which the verdict was determined to be invalid were invariably cases in which the general damages
were either proven by uncontradicted testimony," established
by uncontroverted testimony, 4 shown by a preponderance
of the evidence,"5 or by the weight of the evidence," undisputed, 7 conclusively established, 8 or were such that a reasonable
man could not disagree.1 Such evidence of general damages
is not only found in those cases where the verdict was overturned based on evidence but also in the cases where the
court held that the jury failed to follow instructions 1 and
where the verdict was described as inadequate, inconsistent,
a compromise, or a result of passion or prejudice.2 2
In overturning verdicts awarding substantial medical
expense, but nothing for general damages, courts usually indicate that the basis of their reasoning is that as a general
7. Wall v. Van Meter, supra note.4; Levy v. Jabara, 193 Kan. 595, 396 P.2d
339 (1964).
8. Schriewer v. Schworer, 296 Ky. 749, 178 S.W.2d 598 (1944).
9. Deschane v. McDonald, 86 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1957).
10. Pickel v. Rosen, 214 So. 2d 730 (Fla. App. 1968) ; Burkett v. Moran, 410
P.2d 876 (Okla. 1965).
11. Allbee v. Berry, 254 Iowa 712, 119 N.W.2d 230 (1963).
12. Venuto v. Lubik Oldsmobile, Inc., 70 N.J. Super. 221, 175 A.2d 477 (1961).
13. Wall v. Van Meter, supra note 4; Levy v. Jabara, supra note 7.
14. Cooper v. Christensen, 29 Mich. App. 181, 185 N.W.2d 97 (1970).
15. Franco v. Graham, 470 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
16. Fordon v. Bender, supra note 5; Austria v. Donovan, supra note 5.
17. Levy v. Jabara, eupra note 7.
18. Ashland Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Brady, 252 Ky. 183, 66 S.W.2d 57 (1933).
19. Deschane v. McDonald, supra note 9.
20. Fordon v. Bender, suprd note.5; Austria v. Donovan, upra note 5; Gould v.
Mans, upra note 6.
21. Wall v. Van Meter, spra note 4; Levy v. Jabara, supra note 7; Schriewer
v. Schworer, supra note 8.
22. Deschane v. McDonald, supra note 9; Pickel v. Rosen, supra note 10; Burkett v. Moran, supra note 10; Allbee v. Berry, supra note 11; Venuto v.
Lubik Oldsmobile, Inc., supra note 12.
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rule such verdicts are invalid. Nevertheless, it is obvious that
while strong evidence of general damages is not always given
as the reason in holding invalid those verdicts which award
substantial medical expenses but nothing for general damages, it is a pervasive undercurrent in such decisions.
In examining those cases in which an award for medical
expenses but nothing for general damages has been affirmed,
it is obvious that the evidence presented as to the plaintiff's
injury was the determining factor. The explanations offered
by courts in such circumstances have been that the jury could
reasonably have believed that the injury to the plaintiff was
trivial or not serious,2 3 the jury could reasonably have concluded that the plaintiff suffered no compensable pain or
suffering but did incur compensable medical expenses24 or
that there was evidence of a pre-existing injury which may
have caused the pain and suffering in question.25 In such
cases, the decision was based upon what the jury could reasonably have believed or concluded, given the evidence presented in each case.
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that in cases involving a verdict for substantial hospital and medical expenses with no provision for general damages, the evidence as
to the plaintiff's injury is the crucial determinant. Whether
a preponderance of evidence was indicated in overturning
the verdict or a lack of evidence was indicated in sustaining
the verdict, the question of evidence decided the issue.
CURRENT TREND

Many courts are now recognizing and articulating the
rationale that the appeal from a verdict awarding special but
not general damages must turn on the question of evidence
presented at the trial concerning general damages and the
reasonableness of the jury in arriving at this type of verdict.
23. Davidson v. Schneider, 349 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1961); Randles v. Lowry, 4
Cal. App. 3d 68, 84 Cal. Rptr. 321 (1970).
24. Miami v. Smith, 165 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1964); Whitney v. Akers, 247 F. Supp.
763 (W.D. Okla. 1965).
25. Alessi v. Farkas, 118 So. 2d 658 (Fla. App. 1960).
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In the case of Whitney v. Akers,"0 the following reason was
given by the court in affirming the verdict: "Under the
state of the evidence herein the jury was entitled to find
liability for the accident against the defendant, which it did,
but to also find from the evidence that the plaintiff just did
not receive a personal injury7 in the accident or any pain and
2
suffering from the same."
Recognizing that each case involving the propriety of
the verdict must be viewed separately, the court in Gould v.
Mans 8 said that they were "not willing to adopt an inflexible
rule which would in effect render every verdict approximating a plaintiff's medical
expenses inadequate and invalid as
29
law."
of
a matter
The Oregon Supreme Court in Saum v. Bonar ° modified
an earlier, more strict position 3 ' similar to that currently
applied in Wyoming. There the court reversed the order
granting a new trial and ordered a reinstatement of the verdict which awarded special damages, but only $1 for general
damages. The court pointed out that had the record disclosed
that the plaintiff had been seriously injured, an award for
special damages without general damages would have been improper." However, the court recognized that the issue of
general damages was contested by the defendant in his pleadings and in the evidence and that the jury could reasonably
have believed that the plaintiff suffered no substantial injury
or that he had been compensated by the defendant's earlier
payment for lost wages."
Similarly in Bandles v. Lowry," it was recognized that
a verdict for medical expenses alone might be inadequate as
a matter of law in those cases in which the evidence clearly
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Whitney v. Akers, supra note 24.
Id. at 765.
Gould v. Mans, supra note 6.
Id. at 93.
484 P.2d 294 (Ore. 1971).
Flansberg v. Paulson, 239 Ore. 610, 399 P.2d 356 (1965).
A majority of
the Supreme Court of Oregon adhered to the rule that an award for medical
expenses without an allowance for general damages was improper even in
the face of conflicting evidence as to actual injury suffered by the plaintiff.
32. Saum v. Bonar, supra note 30, at 298.
33. Id. at 297.
34. Randles v. Lowry, supra note 23.
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indicated that the plaintiff suffered inconvenience, serious
pain, or mental suffering. Nevertheless, the court felt that
when there was conflict as to whether the plaintiff suffered
any substantial pain or injury "an award for the exact
amount of, or even less than, the medical expenses is not
necessarily inadequate ..
Smith RE-EXAMINED
Had the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the above

analysis to the facts of Smith, it is possible that the verdict
of the lower court would have been sustained. This analysis
being based upon the fact that, given the disputed evidence as

to the extent of the plaintiff's injury, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the plaintiff suffered no compensable pain and suffering as a result of the accident.
The opinion of Smith is relatively short (three pages)
and is based primarily on the earlier Wyoming decision of
DeWitty v. Decker." The majority opinion touches only
briefly on the element of evidence, saying only that "there
was testimony pertaining to pain and suffering, loss of wages
and disability. There was also testimony regarding treatment
which necessarily resulted in pain and suffering.""
At the trial, the plaintiff claimed an injury to her back,
the
existence of such an injury was disputed by the debut
fendant. The evidence presented included the following:
35. Id. at 324.
36. DeWitty v. Decker, supra note 2. Even though the evidence as to plaintiff's injury in DeWitty was disputed, the court held that a verdict which
allowed medical expenses with no provision for general damages was at
least improper or irregular. The court recognized not only that the evidence presented as to the injury suffered by the plaintiff was disputed but
also that the jury believed that an award for medical expenses alone would
compensate the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court went on to state that
when the verdict was returned by the jury in open court it was as evident
then as it was on appeal that the verdict was irregular and improper. The
court felt that the verdict was defective in matter of substance, as opposed
to defective in matter of form. This is in reference to Wyo. STAT. § 1-132
(1957): "If a jury disagree, or if when the jury is polled, a juror answer
in the negative, or if the verdict is defective in matter of substance, the
jury must be sent out again for further deliberation, and either party may
require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the clerk or court asking each juror if it is his verdict." Citing other cases on this point, the court
in DeWitty held that since the plaintiff had not objected to the form of the
verdict given the jury nor to the verdict when it was returned, to give an
opportunity for correction, the plaintiff had waived her right to do so.
The court sustained the verdict on these grounds.
37. Smith v. Blair, supra note 1, at 583.
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1. The only injury reported at the scene of the accident
was to the driver of the vehicle in which the plaintiff
was riding.
2. The accident vehicle remained in operating condition
and was driven into town by the plaintiff.
3. The plaintiff was x-rayed at the hospital and then
walked approximately ten blocks from the hospital to
her home.
4. The day after the accident the plaintiff, suffering
from nausea and diarrhea, returned to the hospital where
x-rays revealed no internal injuries. The plaintiff statcd,
however, that the nausea and vomiting could have been
caused by hepatitis.
5. The accident occurred on March 27, 1969, but after
these two initial visits to the hospital the plaintiff did
not consult a physician again until November, 1969.
6. The tests conducted on the plaintiff while hospitalized
in November, 1969 were all normal.

Based upon such evidence, it would be reasonable for a jury
to conclude that the plaintiff had suffered no compensable
pain and suffering as a result of the accident caused by the
defendant.3
This view was presented in the dissenting opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Parker:
Under the evidence adduced in this case, the jury
could have believed that plaintiff was not actually
injured but she nevertheless conscientiously thought
she had been and proceeded with tests to attempt
verification of her belief. Under such circumstances,
the jury may have considered it only equitable that
the hospital, X-ray, and medical bills be paid by the
defendant, but there would be no cause for awarding damages for pain and suffering occasioned by
the tests."
38. The defendant, Clarence Blair, after the accident, entered a plea of guilty
to following too closely behind the truck in which the plaintiff was a
passenger.
39. Smith v. Blair, supra note 1, at 583.
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The majority opinion, however, adhered to the strict view
expressed in DeWitty, indicating that when it is "clear that
the award was determined by allowing plaintiff substantial
expenditures for medical and hospital expenses, without an
award for0 general damages, the award is irregular and im4
proper. Besides the primary reliance on DeWitty, the court cited
several other opinions in support of the position taken by
the majority. However, these cases differ markedly from the
Smith case in the all important area of evidence as to the
injury suffered by the plaintiff. An examination of the cited
cases reveals that the evidence presented therein as to general
damages was much stronger and more clearly shown than in
Smith. In each of the cited cases the evidence of general damages was uncontroverted, 4 ' established by great weight, 2 or
proven by uncontradicted testimony,4" all of which differ
from the evidence as to general damages in Smith which was
not undisputed nor uncontroverted.
CONCLUSION

It is submitted that whether or not a verdict which awards
substantial medical damages yet allows nothing for pain and
suffering is invalid should depend upon the evidence relating to the alleged injury and an inflexible rule such as that
utilized by the Wyoming Supreme Court should not be mechanically applied in every case. If, from the evidence, the
jury could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff suffered no
compensable pain and suffering but that the defendant should
pay for such medical expenses directly resulting from the
accident, such a verdict should be sustained. Similarly, if
the evidence of general damages is clearly proved, or is such
that a reasonable man could not disagree, a verdict awarding
only special damages should be overturned.
The above approach is not currently applied in Wyoming
in that the decision in Smith indicates that any such verdict
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Cooper v. Christensen, supra note 14.
Fordon v. Bender, supra note 5; Franco v. Graham, supra note 15.
Wall v. Van Meter, supra note 4.
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is defective in matter of substance, regardless of the evidence presented as to the alleged injury.4 An inflexible rule
of this nature infringes upon the jury's function as the trier
of questions of fact.
Other jurisdictions have recognized that a narrow application of the general rule upon which Smith was based constricts the function of the jury. The Wyoming Supreme
Court should also recognize this fact. It would preserve the
province of the jury if the court adopted a more flexible rule,
allowing verdicts awarding substantial medical expense but
nothing for pain and suffering, to be sustained if the jury
has acted reasonably upon the evidence presented at the trial.
By mentioning the evidence as to the plaintiff's injuries, the
court has opened the way to effect just such a change.
To the general rule that a verdict awarding the plaintiff,
in a personal injury action, the amount of medical expenses
but failing to award damages for pain and suffering is invalid as a matter of law, should be added the proviso, if the
evidence clearly indicates that the plaintiff suffered serious
pain, inconvenience, or mental suffering.
JAMES W. GUSEA

44. While the court in Smith did not expressly state that such a verdict was
"defective in substance," the court did rely heavily upon DeWitty in which
the verdict was defined in that manner. In allowing the appeal in Smith
the court mentioned (as it explained in DeWitty) that the irregularity of
the verdict was raised by the appellant prior to the discharge of the jury,
an obvious reference to the requirement under Wyo. STAT. § 1-132 (1957)
that an objection to a verdict defective in substance must be raised prior
to the discharge of the jury or such right is waived. See note 36 supra.
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